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I.

INTRODUCTION

In Patterson v. McLean Credit Union,' a black employee relied
on 42 U.S.C. § 1981 and alleged racial harassment against her employer, a privately owned company. Section 1981 provides that "[a]ll persons within the jurisdiction of the United States ... shall have the
same right ... to make and enforce contracts ... as is enjoyed by
white citizens .. . .,2 The Patterson Court heard arguments as to

whether 42 U.S.C. § 1981 covered cases of racial harassment in the
workplace. After the Justices heard arguments on that issue, they
asked the parties to brief the uncontested, broader issue of whether
the Court should reconsider its decision in Runyon v. McRary.3 In

*Dedicated to my husband, Peter, for his constant encouragement. The author would like
to thank Professors Robert C.L. Moffat and James C. Quarles for their helpful comments and
criticisms and Daniel B. Yeager for his thoughtful editing.
1. 108 S.Ct. 1419 (1988).
2. 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1982).
3. 427 U.S. 160 (1976).
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Runyon, parents sued under section 1981 when their children were
denied admission to several private schools because of the schools'
policy of racial discrimination. 4 The Runyon Court held that section
1981 prohibits private parties from refusing to enter into contracts
with blacks solely on the basis of race 5 and reasoned that contracts
between parents and private schools fell under the section 1981 um6
brella.

Patterson's sharp dissents 7 recognized that civil rights decisions
play a unique role in American jurisprudence. The dissenters were
"at a loss to understand the [Court's] motivation to reconsider an
interpretation of a civil rights statute that so clearly reflects society's
earnest commitment to ending racial discrimination and in which Congress so evidently has acquiesced." s Moreover, the dissenters recognized that the Court's order would harm "the faith reposed by racial
minorities in the continuing stability of a rule of law that guarantees
them the 'same right' as white citizens."9 Thus, the dissenters
suggested that societal dependence on statutory precedent increasing
the civil rights of minorities is a major factor in the "whether to
overrule" 1o equation."
Despite Patterson'sdisagreement as to whether the Court should
reconsider Runyon's interpretation of section 1981, neither the dissenters nor the majority specified what conditions mandate overruling or
upholding a civil rights precedent based on statutory interpretation.
The Pattersoncontroversy raises the question of what factors courts

4. Id. at 164-65.
5. Id. at 169.
6. Id. at 172.
7. Justices Brennan, Marshall, and Stevens joined in Justice Blackinun's dissenting opinion.
Patterson, 108 S. Ct. at 1421 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Justices Blaclummn, Brennan, and
Marshall joined in Justice Stevens's dissenting opinion. Id. at 1422 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
8. Id. at 1422 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
9. Id. at 1423 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
10. The phrase "whether to overrule' equation" is used throughout this note to indicate
the articulated and unarticulated factors courts consider in deciding whether to uphold or overrule
statutory based precedent.
11. The dissenters also stressed Congress's failure to overrule Runyon. Patterson, 108 S.
Ct. at 1422; see also infra text accompanying notes 18-21 (discussing the Patterson majority's
and dissents' views on legislative inaction). For an analysis of the Patterson/Runyon issue, see
Farber, Interpretation,Inaction, and Civil Rights, 87 MIcH. L. REV. 2 (1988) (discussing the
relevance of original intent and legislative silence to statutory interpretation and the role of
public policy considerations in deciding whether to overrule a statutory based civil rights precedent).
12. See, e.g., Preserving a Civil Rights Legacy[,] Runyon: A First-PersonView, LEGAL
TIMEs, June 20, 1988, at 18; High Court Getting Unusual Plea Not to Reverse Key Rights
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should consider when deciding whether to overrule statutory based
civil rights precedent. Patterson, however, only initiates the inquiry.
Because of the clear pronouncement of its predecessor - Runyon stare decisis makes overruling unlikely. Accordingly, Pattersonis an
easy case. But when Pattersonis long gone, the problem of whether
to overrule statutory based civil rights precedent will remain. This
note therefore views Patterson as a point of departure from which a
coherent approach to statutory based civil rights precedent can be
delineated then ultimately applied to cases much blurrier than it.
This note argues that when a case involves the rights of persons
to work, learn, and otherwise function in society, courts' analyses
should go beyond the doctrines of original legislative intent and stare
decisis. Courts also should consider contemporary society's civil rights
values when deciding whether to overrule statutory based civil rights
precedent. This is not to suggest that courts should become slaves to

Ruling, N.Y. Times, June 24, 1988, at 1, col.4; Even Decisions on Civil Rights Can Be Wrong,
N.Y. Times, June 7, 1988, at 30, col.6; Casting a Shadow Over Civil Rights, N.Y. Times, Apr.
27, 1988, at 26, col.1. See generally Farber, supranote 11, at 2 n.3 (offering examples of national
media attention given the Patterson Court's order for re-argument).
Some recent commentary argues that the Patterson Court should overrule Runyon for a
number of reasons. In Foibles and Fables of Runyon, McClellan argues that Pattersonpresents
the Court with an opportunity to prove that it will not be influenced by special interest groups,
namely the civil rights activists that have filed briefs and otherwise spoken out in favor of
Runyon's interpretation of § 1981. McClellan, Foibles and Fablesof Runyon, 67 WAsH. U.L.Q.
13, 17 (1989). He adds that Runyon's reading of § 1981 defies traditional principles of contract
law by abridging private parties' right to refuse to enter private contracts on whatever basis
they choose. Id.
But the crux of McClellan's argument focuses on original legislative intent. His approach is
quintessentially archeological, for he maintains that the intent of the enacting Congress, not
today's Congress, is controlling. Id. at 38; see also text accompanying notes 103-10 (describing
the archeological and nautical models of statutory interpretation). McClellan submits that the
Court tends to read legislative history selectively, siphoning out portions of legislative debate
favorable to the desired result. Id. at 14. Therefore, Runyon rests on erroneous statutory
interpretation that defied the enacting legislature's intent. Id. at 13-14. Moreover, he criticizes
Justice Stevens's belief, expressed in Runyon, that current mores and the "prevailing sense of
justice" should influence the Court in civil rights cases. Id. at 36 (citing Runyon, 427 U.S. at
191 (Stevens, J., concurring)). While McClellan admits that these are "noble sentiments," he
rejects social values-based rationale and maintains that 'Judges are the guardians of the law,
not of our mores." Id.
Sharply disagreeing with the Patterson dissenters, McClellan characterizes Runyon as an
unconstitutional decision that must be overruled despite stare decisis and social expectations.
Id. at 42-43. He accuses Runyon of usurping the powers of Congress. Id. at 44. Overall,
McClellan maintains that adhering to the enacting legislature's intent is the only way to respect
separation of powers. Id. Hence, the social expectations based on Runyon must give way to
the enacting legislature's intent. Id.
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the current moral climate. Courts should, however, act to uphold
'13
fundamental American values, such as abolishing "badges of slavery.'
This note examines modes of analysis to guide courts deciding
whether to overrule statutory based civil rights precedent. Following
this introduction, part II of this note discusses the importance of
legislative inaction subsequent to judicial statutory interpretation.
Part III analyzes three models of statutory interpretation: the sociological natural law, legal process, and nautical models. Part IV examines
the Court's rationale when interpreting civil rights statutes and overruling statutory based civil rights precedent. Finally, this note
suggests a test to assist courts deciding whether to overrule statutory
based civil rights precedent.
One mode of analysis that assists courts deciding whether to overrule statutory based civil rights precedent is legislative inaction
theory,'4 which holds that legislative inaction reflects the legislature's
tacit acceptance of prior judicial statutory interpretation. Statutory
based civil rights precedent carries greater weight than common law
and constitutionally based precedents because courts reason that the
legislature would act if judicial statutory interpretation were incorrect.
Part II of this note closely examines legislative inaction.
While legislative inaction theory may help courts determine
whether prior judicial statutory interpretation coincided with legislative intent, it slights the social value of civil rights precedent. The
social value of precedent encompasses the degree of social reliance on
precedent and the statement that the precedent makes about society's
attitude toward minorities. The three models of statutory interpretation examined in part III do consider the social value of precedent.
The sociological natural law model relies heavily on the social value
of precedent, sometimes at the expense of original legislative intent.
Another twentieth-century theory, the legal process model of Hart
and Sacks, gives courts discretion to look to the enacting legislature's

13. The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 20 (1883).
14. The legislative inaction argument contends that "legislative silence suggests the judicial
decision correctly reflects the intention of the legislature." Maltz, The Nature of Precedent, 66
N.C.L. REv. 367, 388 (1988); see also Eskridge, Interpreting Legislative Inaction, 87 MICH.
L. REv. 67 (1988) (delineating the nature of the arguments in support of and against legislative
inaction theory). Eskridge defines "legislative inaction" as a term of art describing the argument
that judicial interpretation of a statute must be correct because "Congress has acquiesced...
by not overruling it, has ratified it by reenacting the statute, or.. .was presented with a
formal bill or amendment embodying an alternative interpretation and rejected it." Id. at 67
n.1 and accompanying text.
15. See Maltz, supra note 14, at 388.
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intent or to prior judicial interpretations to determine statutory purpose. Courts choosing the latter will consider the social value of precedent. Professor Aleinikoff offers a revised reading of the legal process model. His revision allows courts to consider the social value of
precedent but also demands that in some instances they take bold
steps contrary to stare decisis. Finally, the nautical model interprets
statutes in light of contemporary society, but ignores the role of stare
decisis and social reliance in the "whether to overrule" equation.
Recent Supreme Court opinions 16 illustrate the need for a coherent
test for determining whether to overrule statutory based civil rights
precedent. Part IV shows that when interpreting civil rights statutes,
the Court has focused on original legislative intent rather than social
expectations. The Court also has focused on original intent when deciding whether to overrule statutory based civil rights precedent. The
importance of other elements in these decisions is unclear. Because
the Court's decisions employ randomly selected criteria, recent cases
conflict as to the importance of social value, stare decisis, and legislative inaction in the "whether to overrule" equation. Part V offers a
test for deciding whether to overrule statutory based civil rights precedent. Employing legislative inaction theory and models of statutory
interpretation, the test respects both legislative authority and the
social value of civil rights precedent.
II.

INTERPRETING LEGISLATIVE INACTION

Courts generally are reluctant to overturn precedent based on
statutory interpretation, reasoning that the legislature would correct
an erroneous interpretation of statutory language or legislative intent. 17 The Pattersondissenters noted Congress's inaction despite the
Court's line of decisions 18 interpreting that section 198119 prohibits

16. See Shaare Tefila Congregation v. Cobb, 107 S. Ct. 2019 (1987); Saint Francis College
v. A1-Khazraji, 107 S. Ct. 2022 (1987).
17. See generally Eskridge, supra note 14, at 67 n.3 (discussing the legislative inaction
decisions handed down during the United States Supreme Court's 1987 and 1986 Terms). Of
course, the Court sometimes rejects the legislative inaction argument and overrules precedent
based on statutory interpretation that Congress has not corrected. See id.
18. This line of decisions began with Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409 (1968).
The Jones Court relied on the legislative history of § 1 of the 1866 Civil Rights Act and held
that § 1982 prohibits public and private acts of racial discrimination in the sale or rental of real
property. Id. at 437. Section 1982, like § 1981, is rooted in § 1 of the 1866 Civil Rights Act.
Section 1982 provides that "[a]ll citizens of the United States shall have the same right... as
is enjoyed by white citizens . . . to inherit, purchase, lease, sell, hold, and convey real and
personal property." 42 U.S.C. § 1982 (1982). Five years later the Court confirmed Jones when
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private acts of discrimination. In his dissenting opinion, Justice
Blackmun argued that because Congress rejected legislation to override Runyon's interpretation of section 1981, the Court should leave
Runyon undisturbed. 20 The Patterson majority, on the other hand,

ordered re-argument as to the scope of section 1981 and thereby
suggested that legislative inaction is not dispositive in the "whether

to overrule" equation. 21 This division between the Pattersonmajority
and dissents illustrates that the Justices disagree on the importance
of legislative inaction. Current literature illustrates that legal scholars
also disagree on this issue.
A.

Contemporary Views on Legislative Inaction

Paralleling the Justices' disagreement as to the weight of legislative
inaction is conflict among scholars on the importance of legislative
inaction in determining legislative intent. Professor Maltz argues that
the importance of legislative inaction is "clearly overstated." Under
his view, legislative silence does not guarantee that judicial interpretation reflects legislative intent.2 Maltz contends that the true '"relev-

it indicated that §§ 1981 and 1982 prohibited racial discrimination by a private swimming club.
Tillnan v. Wheaton-Haven Recreational Ass'n, 410 U.S. 431 (1973). Next in this line is the
1975 Johnson decision, in which the Court held that § 1981 "affords a federal remedy against
discrimination in private employment on the basis of race." Johnson v. Railway Express Agency,
421 U.S. 454, 459-60 (1975). Later in 1975, the Court decided Runyon, explaining that § 1981
sprang from both § 16 of the 1870 Voting Rights Act and § 1 of the 1866 Civil Rights Act.
Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160, 168 n.8 (1975). Concurring in the Runyon opinion, Justice
Stevens asserted that the Jones Court's interpretation of § 1982 was erroneous. Id. at 190
(Stevens, J., concurring). Yet, he concurred in the Runyon opinion because although Jones
failed to "accurately reflect the sentiments of the Reconstruction Congress, it surely accords
with the prevailing sense of justice today." Id. at 191 (Stevens, J., concurring); see also supra
notes 3-6 and accompanying text (discussing the facts of Runyon and the Court's reasoning).
19. Because the Court has read the legislative history of the 1866 Civil Rights Act as
indicating that §§ 1981 and 1982 derived from the same source, the Court's interpretation of §
1982 is equivalent to its interpretation of § 1981. See supra note 18.
20. Patterson, 108 S.Ct. at 1422-23 (Blaclummn, J., dissenting).
21. Id. at 1420-21. The majority opinion supports a formalist view of statutory interpretation:
the statutory text and legislative history must support the judicial statutory interpretation.
Therefore, the formalist view argues, subsequent Congresses' failure to overturn the interpretation is irrelevant to the correctness of the interpretation. See Eskridge, supra note 14, at 97;
see also Farber, supranote 11, at 8-14 (delineating the debate regarding the weight of congressional silence subsequent to judicial statutory interpretation).
22. Maltz, supra note 14, at 388.
23. Id. at 389. At least one Supreme Court Justice shares Maltz's view that legislative
inaction is overrated as an indicator of legislative intent. Dissenting in the Johnson decision,
Justice Scalia argued that factors aside from legislative acquiescence account for legislative
inaction. Johnson v. Transportation Agency, 107 S.Ct. 1442, 1471-76 (1987) (Scalia, J., dissent-
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ant intent" is that of the enacting legislature. 4 Because the composition
of the legislature may have changed by the time a court interprets
the statute,2 a judicial interpretation in accord with current legislative
intent may offend the intent of the "relevant" legislature.26 Once the
"relevant" legislature has disbanded, the risk emerges that erroneous

judicial statutory interpretation may go uncorrected.
Maltz emphasizes that legislative inertia often accounts for legislative inaction.- For example, legislators' practice of trading off their
votes for reciprocal support on unrelated issues may prevent them
from correcting erroneous statutory interpretation.2 Likewise, the
legislature may believe that the judicial decision is less important than
more pressing legislative issues.2 For these reasons, legislative inertia, and not legislative acquiescence, accounts for some legislative
inaction. The theory that the legislature would inevitably act to correct
erroneous statutory interpretation therefore is flawed. 30
Maltz concludes that the Court's reluctance to overrule statutory
based precedent reflects the role of judicial interpretation as the final
step in the legislative process.3 1 Judicial interpretation defines the

ing). See generally Eskridge, Politics Without Romance: Implications of Public Choice Theory
for Statutory Interpretation, 74 VA. L. REV. 275, 334-37 (1988) (discussing Justice Scalia's
public choice arguments in Johnson); Farber, supra note 11, at 11 (discussing Justice Scalia's
Johnson dissent).
24. Maltz, supra note 14, at 389. Contra infra text accompanying notes 103-10 (discussing
the nautical model of statutory interpretation, which pointedly disagrees with Maltz's premise).
25. Maltz, supra note 14, at 389.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Id. Also, parliamentary maneuvering might effect a victory for minority views. Id.
29. Id.
30. Id. at 389-90. To illustrate the inadequacy of legislative inaction theory, Maltz points
to Boys Markets, which overruled Sinclair - decisions cited by the Patterson majority as
illustrative of the Court's prior overrulings. Id.; see Boys Markets, Inc. v. Retail Clerks Union,
398 U.S. 235 (1970) (overruling Sinclair Refining Co. v. Atkinson, 370 U.S. 195 (1962)). Boys
Markets overruled Sinclair's interpretation of § 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act
and held that § 301 empowered federal courts to enjoin certain labor strikes. Boys Markets,
398 U.S. at 253-55. According to Maltz, Congress's silence subsequent to Sinclair and Boys
Markets suggests the inadequacy of the legislative inaction theory. Maltz, supra note 14, at
390. "Under accepted canons of statutory interpretation, either Sinclair ... or Boys Markets
must have been incorrectly decided ...[y]et Congress took no action to reverse either decision.
Such inaction dramatically illustrates the unreliability of legislative inaction as a measure of the
correctness of a judicial interpretation of a statute." Id.
31. Maltz, supra note 14, at 392. In drawing this conclusion, Maltz builds on Levi's theory
that maintaining statutory precedent preserves the separation of powers between the judiciary
and the legislature. Id. at 390 (discussing E.LEvi, AN INTRODUCTION TO LEGAL REASONING
(1948)).
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rights established by statute. 2 Only the legislature has the power to
alter these rights because judicial interpretation becomes part of the

legislation itself.
Another view, promulgated by Professor Eskridge, holds that legis-

lative inaction doctrine makes sense only as a presumption by which
courts infer legislative intent.34 Eskridge refers to "building block"

interpretations. A building block interpretation is a settled, authoritative interpretation that guides the decisions of private parties and
public officials . 5 A court handing down a building block statutory
interpretation imposes on the legislature the burden of responding to

the interpretation in order to clarify legislative intent.6 Absent legislative response, a presumption of correctness applies in favor of the
building block interpretation.7 But the presumption of correctness is
rebuttable; a court may overrule a "clearly incorrect" interpretation.3
32. Id. at 392.
33. Id.
34. Eskridge, supra note 14, at 70. Eskridge's is a descriptive model. He asserts that the
presumption approach explains the Court's legislative inaction precedent and renders the Court's
analysis of legislative inaction coherent. Id. at 69-70. In contrast, legislative inaction doctrine
is at best a weak indicator of the "actual collective will or desire of the enacting legislature."
Id. at 60-70. See generally id. at 90-108 (analyzing Supreme Court decisions that illustrate
problems with inferring actual legislative intent from legislative inaction).
35. Id. at 111. Eskridge qualifies that private parties have either actually or "probably"
relied on the building block interpretation, and public decisionmakers have either actually or
"apparently" relied on it. Id. Moreover, the building block interpretation must possess vertical
and horizontal continuity. Id. at 120. "'Vertical continuity" refers to 'the consistency of interpretation over time." Id. at 116. "Horizontal continuity" refers to the consistency of interpretation
with current legislative and social policies. Id.
36. Id. at 108.
37. Id. at 108-11. Eskridge explains that the Court readily overrules nonbuilding block
statutory based precedent despite subsequent legislative inaction. Id. at 111. He illustrates this
explanation with Monell, a decision cited by the Pattersonmajority as illustrative of the Court's
prior overrulings. Id. at 111-12; see Monell v. New York City Dep't of Social Servs., 436 U.S.
658 (1978) (overruling Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961)). The Monell Court overruled Monroe
notwithstanding legislative inaction, reasoning that the Court should not mechanically apply the
doctrine of stare decisis. Monell, 436 U.S. at 695. The Monell Court re-examined the legislative
history of the Civil Rights Act and determined that '"municipalities" are "persons" to whom §
1983 applies. Id. at 670-92. Moreover, the Court found no justifiable reliance claim by
municipalities that could support immunity from § 1983. Id. at 699-700. Eskridge concludes that
the Court considered Monroe an unsettled precedent and not a building block. Eskridge, supra
note 14, at 111. Moreover, the Monell Court's re-examination of the legislative history of the
Civil Rights Act indicated that Monroe was an erroneous interpretation of § 1983. Id. at 112.
Therefore, Eskridge asserts, even if Monroe were a building block interpretation, the Monell
Court had reason to overrule it. Id.; see also infra text accompanying notes 134-39 (discussing
the Monell Court's reasoning).
38. Eskridge, supra note 14, at 112. For example, Congress's disapproval of the building
block interpretation would indicate its incorrectness. Id. at 120; see also supra note 37 (offering
an illustration of a "clearly incorrect" statutory interpretation).
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According to Eskridge, Runyon is a building block interpretation
that enjoys the presumption of correctness.3 9 First, Runyon is consistent with preceding and subsequent decisions, so Runyon coincides40
with the legal system's ongoing commitment to antidiscrimination.
Second, the public has relied on Runyon, illustrated by briefs from
Congress and forty-seven states supporting Runyon's interpretation
of section 1981.41 Third, and according to Eskridge least important,
private parties have relied on Runyon.4 For example, parents have
enrolled their children in private schools in reliance on Runyon's holding that section 1981 prohibits private discrimination.4 According to
Eskridge, Runyon should enjoy the presumption of correctness absent
evidence that it constitutes clearly incorrect interpretation of section
1981. 4
That legislative inaction reflects legislative intent persuades Eskridge more than it does Maltz. But accepting Eskridge's emphasis
on legislative inaction leads to another inquiry: How important is legislative inaction to the "whether to overrule" equation?
B.

Legislative Inaction and Interpreting Civil Rights Statutes

Assuming that legislative inaction enters the equation, a more difficult question arises: How much weight should legislative inaction
carry when a civil rights statute is at issue? 4 Together, the Patterson
dissents 41 and Eskridge's view4 7 partially answer this question. The
Court accords a presumption of correctness to building block civil
rights interpretations followed by legislative inaction.4 But the

39.

Eskridge, supra note 14, at 120.

40.
41.

Id.
See id. at 121.

42. Id.
43.

See Brief of 66 Members of the United States Senate and 118 Members of the United

States House of Representatives as Amid Curiae in Support of Petitioner, at 18, Runyon v.
McCrary, 427 U.S. 160 (1976) (No. 75-306); see also Eskridge, supra note 14, at 121 (claimants
relying on the availability of § 1981 could lose legal rights if Runyon were overruled).
44. See Eskridge, supra note 14, at 122.
45. Farber submits that because the settings of cases vary, the relative importance of
legislative inaction varies. See Farber, supra note 11, at 14. The Pattersonsetting is "unusually

suggestive of [legislative] approval," so post Runyon congressional silence "deserves substantial
weight." Id.; see also id. at 8-14 (examining the weight of legislative inaction in relation to stare
decisis, particularly in Patterson).
46. Patterson, 108 S. Ct. at 1421-22 (Blackmun, J., dissenting); id. at 1422-23 (Stevens, J.,

dissenting); see supratext accompanying notes 8-9 (quoting portions of the Pattersondissents).
47. See supra notes 34-38 and accompanying text.
48. See supra text accompanying notes 35-38.
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"whether to overrule" equation should compel courts to consider not
only legislative inaction but also the social value of the civil rights
49
precedent.
The Pattersonmajority and dissents disagreed as to the significance
of the social value of Runyon, the precedent under scrutiny 0 The
dissenters emphasized "society's . . . commitment to ending racial

discrimination"' 51 and racial minorities' dependence on the stability of
civil rights precedent.- The majority, on the other hand, emphasized
the need for accurate statutory interpretation and unequivocally refused to consider the civil rights nature of Runyon.5 In fact, the
majority lumped statutory precedent into one category, citing numerous cases in which the Court overruled precedent based on statutory
interpretation.-5 Only one of these overrulings dealt with a civil rights

statute.r

49. The Pattersondissenters argued that the social value of Runyon is significant. Patterson,
108 S. Ct. at 1421-22 (Blackmun, J., dissenting); id. at 1422-23 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
50. Id. at 1421-22 (Blackmun, J., dissenting); id. at 1422-23 (Stevens, J., dissenting). For
discussion of the disagreement between the Pattersonmajority and dissents, see Farber, supra
note 11, at 14-20. Farber examines the Patterson majority's view that considering the civil
rights nature of Runyon would defy neutral principles of adjudication. Id. at 14-15. Farber
asserts that if public values are relevant to stare decisis, Pattersonis an "easy case" because
of the powerful, noncontroversial nature of the values it involves. Id. at 17. He argues that
public values should factor into the stare decisis issue for three reasons. First, stare decisis is
a prudential doctrine. Id. Second, instability is costly where social values are at stake. Id. at
18. Third, when the issue is whether to overrule an incorrect judicial interpretation, public
choice theory suggests that public policy should outweigh original intent. Id. at 19.
51. Patterson, 108 S. Ct. at 1422 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
52. Id. at 1423 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
53. Id. at 1420-21.
54. See id. The following is a sketch of the decisions cited by the Patterson majority: (1)
Monell v. New York City Dep't of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978) (overruling Monroe v.
Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961)). Of all the decisions cited by the Pattersonmajority, only this pair
dealt with a civil rights statute, § 1983. See also supra note 33 and infra text accompanying
notes 131-36 (discussing Monell and Monroe). (2) Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc.,
433 U.S. 36 (1977) (overruling United States v. Arnold Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365 (1967)).
Continental overruled Schwinn's interpretation of § 1 of the Sherman Act. Id. at 58. The
Continental Court reasoned that Schwinn was an abrupt departure from precedent, that Schwinn,
needed clarification, and that Schwinn had been the subject of judicial and scholarly controversy.
Id. at 46. (3) Lodge 76, Int'l Ass'n of Machinists v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Comm'n,
427 U.S. 132 (1976) (overruling International Union, UAW, Local 232 v. Wisconsin Employment
Relations Bd., 336 U.S. 245 (1949) (commonly referred to as Briggs-Stratton)). Machinists
overruled Briggs-Stratton'sinterpretation of the NLRA regarding federal preemption of the
authority of state labor relations boards. Id. at 154. Although mindful of stare decisis, the
Machinists Court overruled Briggs-Strattonbecause subsequent Court decisions had undercut
Briggs-Stratton'sholding and Briggs-Stratton frustrated national labor policy. Id. at 141, 154.
(4) Braden v. Thirtieth Judicial Circuit Court, 410 U.S. 484 (1973) (overruling Ahrens v. Clark,
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The Pattersondissents soundly present the importance of the social
value of statutory based civil rights precedent. For a legal system to
remain effective, society must respect and support its decisions.5 Society's perception of the Court's commitment to racial equality therefore is important to the continued effectiveness of the legal system. 57
Moreover, the Court's candid commitment to civil rights would further
society's support of the legal system.s By considering the social value
of civil rights precedent in the decision whether to overrule, the Court

could weigh society's desire for racial equality against the desire for

335 U.S. 188(1948)). Braden overruled Ahrens's interpretation of 28 U.S.C. § 2241(a) as requiring
that habeas corpus petitions be brought in the district of petitioner's confinement. Id. at 499-501.
Post-Ahrens developments indicated that congressional intent was contrary to Ahrens's holding.
Id. at 497-99. Invoking a formalist argument, the Braden dissent asserted that subsequent
legislative developments do not alter original congressional intent and therefore do not constitute
reason to overrule a decision based on sound statutory interpretation. Id. at 510-11 (Rehnquist,
J., dissenting); see also supranote 21 (attributing formalist reasoning to the Pattersonmajority).
(5) Andrews v. Louisville & Nashville R.R., 406 U.S. 320 (1972) (overruling Moore v. Illinois
Cent. R.R., 312 U.S. 630 (1941)). Andrews overruled Moore's interpretation of the Railway
Labor Act regarding adjustment and arbitration of grievances. 406 U.S. at 332. Even though
some post-Moore decisions affirmed its holding, others repudiated its rationale. Id. at 323-25.
(6) Boys Markets, Inc. v. Retail Clerk's Union, 398 U.S. 235 (1970) (overruling Sinclair Refining
Co. v. Atkinson, 370 U.S. 195 (1962)). Boys Markets overruled Sinclair's interpretation of §
301 of the Labor Management Relations Act. Id. at 255; see also supra note 30 (discussing the
Boys Markets and Sinclair decisions). (7) Peyton v. Rowe, 391 U.S. 54 (1968) (overruling
McNally v. Hill, 293 U.S. 131 (1934)). Peyton overruled McNally's reading of 28 U.S.C. §
2241(c)(3) and held that the habeas corpus statute authorized attacks upon future consecutive
sentences. 391 U.S. at 67. The Peyton Court reasoned that McNally frustrated the purpose of
the writ of habeas corpus by delaying judicial review of allegedly unlawful restraints. Id. at 63.
Moreover, McNally conflicted with other Court decisions and rested on an incorrect reading of
§ 2241(c)(3). Id. at 63-65.
55. See Monell, 436 U.S. at 658 (overruling Monroe, 365 U.S. at 167); supra note 54.
56. See infra note 58 and accompanying text; cf. L. FULLER, ANATOMY OF THE LAW 47
(1968) (Statutes are effective only if backed by public acceptance. If courts attempt to enforce
socially unaccepted statutes, public resistance ensues. So, courts have a stake in society's perception of judicial statutory interpretation. Therefore, by openly considering the societal value
of precedent furthering racial equality, the Court will foster respect for the legal system.).
57. See L. FULLER, supra note 56, at 47.
58. See Farber, supra note 11, at 15. Lon Fuller asserted the necessity of lawmakers'
candor. L. FULLER, THE MoRALrry OF LAW 49-50, 81-83 (rev. ed. 1969). He delineated eight
desiderata of the 'Inner morality of law." Id. at 33-94. A legal system should strive to create
laws that are general, publicized, prospective, clear, noncontradictory, performable, stable over
time, and congruent as announced and administered. Id. Each desideratum is a principle of
legality. Id. at 41. Since perfect legality is aspirational, a legal system that achieves even one
desideratum has achieved the threshold legality necessary for law to exist. Id. at 41-44. A legal
system can achieve perfect legality by fulfilling all eight desiderata. Id.
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"accurate" statutory interpretation as indicated by legislative inaction.
The Court would favor the former when society's desire for racial
equality is strong.
Considering the importance of social value does not mean that the
Court should ignore legislative inaction. Legislative inaction can remain part of the "whether to overrule" equation in civil rights contexts
even if social value is the more important factor. For example, the
social value of a civil rights precedent could outweigh evidence that
the precedent rested on erroneous statutory interpretation.59 If legislative inertia, and not acquiescence, caused legislative inaction subsequent to the building block interpretation,6 social value would factor
into the equation, trumping arguments of legislative intent. Despite
its lesser importance, legislative inaction still would enter the "whether
to overrule" equation.
Including both social value and legislative inaction in the "whether
to overrule" equation demands a detailed judicial inquiry. Courts must
analyze the importance of social expectations in relation to statutory
interpretation. Twentieth-century models of statutory interpretation
offer the means by which courts can analyze the social factor.
III.

MODELS OF STATUTORY INTERPRETATION

Although legislative inaction theory offers some guidance to a court
deciding whether to overrule a judicial statutory interpretation, it fails
to offer an effective way for a court to determine statutory meaning
in the context of contemporary society. Several theories of statutory
interpretation provide models that do consider social value in assessing
whether a statutory based precedent should survive. When a civil
rights precedent is at issue, courts could use these models to add
social value to the "whether to overrule" equation.
A.

The Sociological Natural Law Model

Lon Fuller's sociological natural law model focuses on social value. 61
This model proceeds from his definition of law as "the enterprise of

59. Eskridge argues that courts overrule "clearly incorrect" building block interpretations
despite subsequent legislative inaction. See supra notes 34-38 and accompanying text.
60. See supra text accompanying notes 27-30.
61. Through the sociological natural law model, Fuller aimed to discover principles of social
order that would facilitate harmonious existence. See Moffat, Lon Fuller: NaturalLawyer After
All!, 26 AM. J. JURIS. 190, 190-92 (1981). Fuller focused on procedure as the source of principles
of social order. See id. at 193. His sociological natural law model is therefore also referred to
as "procedural natural law." See id. at 194. Because he concentrated on procedure, critics accused
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subjecting human conduct to the governance of rules."2 Fuller's concept emphasizes law as an ongoing, interactive process, not a finished
product.6 Statutory interpretation, like interpretation throughout the
legal enterprise, can maintain legitimacy only by maintaining its interactive nature 4
Fuller finds "something more to the task of interpreting statutes
than simply 'carrying out the intention of the legislature.'65 This
"something more" consists partly of the expectations of those members
of society affected by the judiciary's standards of interpretation.66 For
example, the legislature expects courts of the relevant jurisdiction to
interpret as broadly or restrictively as they have in the past.6 The
legislative drafter chooses statutory language with the courts' past
interpretations in mind.6
Because of the importance of social expectations to statutory in69
terpretation, Fuller asserts that much of written law is unwritten.
That is, statutes contain elements of implicit law.70 Fuller defines
implicit law as law that is not declared or enacted, but develops over
time. 71 To interpret statutes correctly, courts must recognize the implicit elements underlying written law.

Fuller of moral relativism. For example, D'Amato saw Fuller's focus on procedure and failure
to develop substantive natural law principles as a "fear of code-like moral absolutes." See
D'Amato, Lon Fuller and Substantive Natural Law, 26 Am. J. JURIs. 202, 212 n.34 (1981); see
also Moffat, The Perilsof Positivismor Lon FullersLesson on Looking at Law: NeitherScience
Nor Aystery - Aerely Method, 10 HARv. J.L. & PUB.POL'Y 295, 331-32 (defending Fuller's
sociological natural law model and explaining that although Fuller rejected moral absolutes, he
did not shun substantive natural law).
62. L. FULLER, supranote 58, at 96. Fuller emphasized the facilitative, in addition to the
remedial, aspects of law. See id. at 223. However, his definition of law as interactive permeates
all aspects of law, including criminal law. See, e.g., Fuller, supra note 56, at 18 (stating that
society's reasonable interpretation defines the meaning of a criminal statute).
63. See L. FULLER, supra note 56, at 18; L. FULLER, Supra note 58, at 96-98.
64. See L. FULLER, supra note 58, at 224-27.
65. See id. at 231.
66. See id.
67. See id.
68. See id.
69. Id. at 232.
70. L. FULLER, supra note 56, at 43-84. Reciprocally, implicit law contains elements of
made law. Id. at 69-84. Customary or implicit law does not grow arbitrarily. Id. at 83. Instead,
implicit law, such as the expectations of binding parties to a valid contract, grows from each
party's preconceived notions of what constitutes correct behavior according to the terms of the
contract. See id. at 69-84. In this manner, the implicit expectations of contracting parties are
"made" or enacted.
71. Id. at 44. According to Fuller, custom is quintessential implicit law. Id.
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One implicit element in any effective law is social acceptance.2
Fuller's theory posits that courts will tend not to enforce laws that
run counter to societal notions of what is right.7 Prosecutorial discretion, restrictive judicial interpretations, and public resistance all contribute to this phenomenon.74The implicit element of social acceptance
also affects judicial interpretation of statutory language. Wise statu-

tory interpretation not only respects consistency but also understands
social context and situational needs. 7r Courts, under Fuller's theory,

interpret more than a word or phrase -

they interpret society's at-

titudes, practices, and expectations of what a word or phrase encompasses. 76
A court utilizing the sociological natural law model in deciding
whether to overrule a statutory based civil rights precedent would
engage in a modified "free inquiry approach." The court would strive

to reach the "right" result based on social expectations. Faced with
the decision of whether to overrule statutory based civil rights precedent, the court primarily would consider social perception of the court's

commitment to civil rights. 78 It would delineate the social reasons for
its decision in order to foster legality and public acceptance. 79
72. Id. at 47. '"here are philosophers who, far from deploring this state of affairs, welcome
it . . . . In their view the living law - the real law - grows and shapes itself silently in
response to the felt needs of those who are subject to it." Id.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. L. FULLER, supra note 58, at 229.
76. L. FULLER, supra note 56, at 58. To illustrate this principle, Fuller offers the example
of an ordinance prohibiting any "vehicle" from entering an inner city "park." Id. at 57-59. Courts
interpreting the ordinance in two obvious cases would assess that "vehicle" includes a ten-ton
truck but excludes a perambulator. Id. at 58. Although these interpretations of "vehicle" are
"easy cases," courts interpret the statutory language by considering what is implicit in the
notion of a park. Id. The practices and attitudes of the society determine the definition of
"park." Id. For example, one city's park may be a quiet place where citizens escape the tumult
of the inner city. Id. Another city's park may be the site of concerts, ball games, and other
lively activities. See id. Courts resolve more difficult cases by considering society's conception
of what is fit to come into a park. Id. at 59. Eventually, the social institution "park" and the
regulations affecting parks influence one another reciprocally. Id.
77. The free scientific inquiry approach originated in F. GENY, MITHOD D'INTERPRPTATION ET SOURCES EN DROIT PRIVt POSITIF (1899). Eskridge, supra note 14, at 275. Eskridge
asserts that under the free inquiry approach "the court's role is to reach the best result, formally
unconstrained (though perhaps influenced or persuaded) by the statute's text and legislative
history." Id. According to Eskridge, the polar opposite of the free inquiry approach is the
"archeological" approach. Id. Eskridge credits Alexander Aleinikoff with originating the archeological metaphor. Id. at 275 n.1; see also Aleinikoff, Updating Statutory Interpretation,87
MICH. L. REV. 20, 21 (1988) (defining the archeological approach).
78. See supratext accompanying notes 72-76. This methodology can be seen in the constitutional analogue of statutory based civil rights decisionmaking. In Brown v. Board of Education,
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But what of precedent based on clearly incorrect statutory interpretation under a sociological natural law approach? If social perception
were to reign paramount in the "whether to overrule" equation, would
legislative intent be relegated to a footnote in the deciding court's

opinion? Probably not. Fuller's definition of "wise" statutory interpretation contains two elements. First, courts must strive to interpret

statutes to coincide with society's expectations. Second, courts must
respect the need for consistent statutory interpretations2o Consistency, in turn, is partially based on statutory language.

347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954), perhaps the most renowned civil rights decision, the Court's holding
that the fourteenth amendment prohibits racial segregation of public school children rested on
a socially based rationale. Realizing that historical sources are inconclusive indicators of the
scope of constitutional amendments regarding civil rights, id. at 489-90, the Brown Court refused
to be bound by the circumstances surrounding the adoption of the fourteenth amendment in
1868. Id. at 489. Instead, Brown focused on contemporary society, emphasizing that the "separate-but-equal" doctrine of Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896), no longer held a place in
contemporary society or American jurisprudence. 347 U.S. at 491-92.
Brown analyzed the effect of Plessy's sanctioned racial segregation on contemporary public
education. First, the Court noted that since Plessy, blacks had achieved artistic, business, and
scientific success. Id. at 490. The Court reasoned that education constituted the foundation of
an individual's social development and that government-sanctioned segregation had a uniquely
strong impact on society. Id. at 493-94. Judicially sanctioned segregation would decrease the
black child's motivation to learn and would place the Court's imprimatur on the social inequality
of blacks.
The Court also considered the gradual decline of Plessy's "separate-but-equal" doctrine.
Post-Plessydecisions had whittled away at its doctrine, finding inequality in segregated graduate
school programs. Id. at 491-92. Aware of society's growing disapproval of the Plessy doctrine,
the Brown Court held that in the field of education, separate but equal had no basis in current
social exTectations. Id. at 492-94.
Within its discussion of social criteria, Brown employed elements of the sociological natural
law, legal process, and nautical models. As noted earlier in this paper, the sociological natural
law model sees a rule of law as an ongoing process, not as a doctrine set in stone at its inception.
See supra notes 61-64 and accompanying text. In keeping with the model, Brown refused to
base its decision on circumstances surrounding the 1868 enactment of the fourteenth amendment.
347 U.S. at 489. Brown also contains elements of the revised legal process analysis. See supra
notes 92-95 and accompanying text. Revised legal process analysis focuses on the current legal
system and society to determine statutory purpose. Brown examined the fourteenth amendment's
purpose, guaranteeing equal protection, in light of contemporary legal and social trends. It
looked at recent cases that restricted the "separate-but-equal" doctrine and recognized that
"separate-but-equal" had no place in the current legal system. Finally, by focusing on contemporary legal and social trends, Brown also employed elements of the nautical approach. See
supra notes 103-10 and accompanying text. The nautical approach interprets statutes according
to the current legislature's attitudes and practices. Brown used a nautical analysis because it
eliminated the original intent inquiry. In effect, Brown decided that a modern legislature's
definition of "equal protection" would not include "separate-but-equal."
79. See supra note 58 and accompanying text.
80. See supra text accompanying note 75.
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Fuller's call for consistency respects the evolved meaning of statutory language. Because Fuller defines law as ongoing,", the meaning
of statutory language is not necessarily set by the enacting legislature.
Much of the meaning of a statute derives from the judicial gloss placed
on the legislature's words. The litigant plays an important role in
creating this judicial gloss, for the litigant who brings a statutory
based claim necessarily secures judicial interpretation of statutory
language A5
While courts determine the evolved meaning of statutory language,
the enacting legislature's words form the basis of the meaning of the
statute. To stray too far from statutory language in creating a judicial
gloss would render statutory interpretation inconsistent and unacceptable to members of society who rely on the stability of law in ordering
their lives. In this manner, a court following the sociological natural
law model would be influenced but not constrained by statutory language. Overall, while the sociological natural law model would yield
a decision based on the social value of the civil rights precedent at
issue, its statutory interpretation may have gradually strayed from
original legislative intent.
B.

The Legal Process Model

Unlike Fuller's model that may result in statutory interpretation
contrary to original legislative intent, another twentieth-century model
- the legal process model - focuses on legislative intent. In The
Legal Process,84 Hart and Sacks base their approach to statutory interpretation5 on the premise that "every statute must be conclusively

81. See L. FULLER, supra note 56, at 18; L. FULLER, supra note 58, at 96-98; supra text
accompanying notes 62-64.
82. See L. FULLER, supra note 56, at 102. On this point, Fuller's theory is similar to
Maltz's conclusion that judicial interpretation defines the rights secured by the statute and
becomes part of the statute itself. Fuller, however, emphasizes society's contribution to the
judicial interpretation. See also supra text accompanying notes 31-33 (Maltz's conclusion).
83. L. FULLER, supra note 56, at 102.
84. H. HART & A. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN THE MAKING
AND APPLICATION OF LAW (tent. ed. 1958).
85. Numerous scholars have delineated Hart & Sacks's legal process model. See, e.g.,
Aleinikoff, supranote 77, at 24-34 (discussing the intentionalist nature of Hart & Sacks's theory
and the current attack on intentionalism, and offering an updated reading of Hart & Sacks's
theory); Blatt, The History of Statutory Interpretation:A Study in Form and Substance, 6
CARDOZO L. REV. 799, 832-33 (1985) (offering historical perspective and positioning Hart &
Sacks's legal process model in the post-Realist era); Macey, PromotingPublic-RegardingLegislation Through Statutory Interpretation:An Interest Group Model, 86 CoLUM. L. REv. 223,
250-51 (1986) (describing Hart and Sacks's traditional approach as a means of advancing a
statute's public-regarding purpose).
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presumed to be a purposive act.""- According to Hart and Sacks, the
interpreting court's goal is to identify statutory purpose and render
its decision accordingly.8 The interpreting court can infer statutory
purpose by first assuming that "the legislature was made up of reasonable persons pursuing reasonable purposes reasonably."8 Next, the
court should follow Lord Coke's rule of Heydon's Cases9 and determine
the "mischief' the enacting legislature sought to eliminate. The court
is free to consider legislative history and postenactment occurrences
to determine statutory purpose. 9 1
While recognizing that Hart and Sacks's model emphasizes the
enacting legislature's concept of statutory purpose, a recent interpretation of The Legal Process emphasizes a broader focus. Professor
Aleinikoff submits that Hart and Sacks's model of statutory purpose
demands that the interpreting court consider the legal and social context of the statute in question.9 Moreover, he insists that the court
must look beyond the purpose of the individual statute and interpret
the statute to fit within a coherent legal system.93 Aleinikoff explains
that the Hart and Sacks model considers the individual statute's purpose and the broader purpose of the existing legal system and society.9

86. H. HART & A. SACKS, supra note 84, at 1156; see also Aleinikoff, supra note 77, at
34-35 (asserting that Hart & Sacks's theory of statutory interpretation flows from their conception
of law as a "purposive activity, a continuous striving to solve the basic problems of social living")
(quoting H. HART & A. SACKS, supra note 84, at 166). For a discussion of Aleinikoffs revised
reading of Hart & Sacks's legal process approach, see infra text accompanying notes 92-95.
87. H. HART & A. SACKS, supra note 84, at 1414-15.
88. Id.
89. 76 Eng. Rep. 637 (Ex. 1854).
90. H. HART & A. SACKS, supra note 84, at 1415.
91. Id. at 1415-16.
92. Aleinikoff, supra note 77, at 35.
93. Id.
94. Id. In contrast to the legal process view, which focuses on statutory purpose, economic
theory doubts that any coherent statutory purpose exists. According to Posner, economic literature reveals three major theories of legislation: public interest theory, interest group theory,
and legislative process theory. Posner, Economics, Politics, and the Reading of Statutes and
the Constitution,49 U. Cm. L. REV. 263, 264-70 (1982). Public interest theory optimistically
defines ideal legislation as that which increases economic welfare by eliminating "market failures
such as crime and pollution." Id. at 265. Interest group theory pessimistically asserts a supply
and demand view of legislation. See id. According to interest group theory, legislation is a
commodity that benefits the most effective interest groups. See id. at 265-66. In fact, interest
group theory has been part of American jurisprudence since 1787 when James Madison identified
political "factions" in THE FEDERALIST No. 10 (J. Madison). Unlike public interest and interest
group theories, legislative process theory focuses on the legislative process, not statutory substance, to explain legislative procedures and trends. Posner, supra, at 268.
Despite the continuing presence of economic theory in American jurisprudence, no one
economic model of statutory interpretation has emerged. However, several jurists have examined
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Since the model recognizes the dynamic nature of law, it supports the
judiciary's efforts to align statutory interpretation with the changing
needs of society9 5
A court employing the legal process approach to statutory interpretation would identify and apply statutory purpose9 but would have to
choose between alternative methods. The court could identify statutory
purpose by looking solely to the enacting legislature and considering
the mischief it sought to eradicate. Or, the court could look to the
statutory purpose inferred by other courts interpreting the same statute or related statutes. The Legal Process advocates both methods
even though they could produce different results.9 7 In the context of
a civil rights statute, the method employed by the interpreting court
would determine whether the court considered the social value of
precedent.
The question remains whether a court following the legal process
model would consider the social value of a civil rights precedent in
the "whether to overrule" equation. A court looking only to the enact-

statutory interpretation in light of economic theory. Posner offers a positive analysis of how
economic theory explains past and current patterns of judicial statutory interpretation. See id.
at 264-82. Easterbrook submits that when interpreting legislation, the court should determine
the underlying agreement between the interest group and the legislature by analyzing the
statute the way it would analyze a private contract. Easterbrook, The Supreme Court, 1983
Term - Foreword: The Court and the Economic System, 98 HARv. L. REV. 4, 14-18 (1984).
See generally Macey, supranote 85, at 233-40 (comparing Easterbrook's view to that of Landes
& Posner, The Independent Judiciaryin an Interest-GroupPerspective, 18 J.L. & ECON. 875
(1975) (examining the details and flaws in Easterbrook's view)).
Aleinikoff discusses the public choice view that legislatures, hence statutes, have no purpose
but merely reflect the influence of special interest groups. Aleinikoff, supra note 77, at 35-36.
But Aleinikoff sees the revised legal process approach as the cure for unprincipled legislative
decisions. Id. at 36. By interpreting statutes according to assumed reasonable legislative purpose,
courts will "[weave] the imputed purpose into the general fabric of the law." Id.
95. Aleinikoff, supra note 77, at 36.
96. See supra text accompanying notes 84-91; see also Blatt, supra note 85, at 828-34
(identifying Radin as the forerunner of the purposive approach to statutory interpretation furthered by Hart and Sacks). Radin distinguished statutory purpose from legislative intent. Id. at
829 (discussing Radin, A Short Way With Statutes, 56 HARv. L. REV. 388, 406 (1942)). Radin
instructed the interpreting court to defer to the legislature without probing into subjective
legislative intent. Id. at 829-30 (discussing Radin, supra, at 410-11).
97. See Hart & Sacks, supra note 84, at 1414-16. Aleinikoff discusses the apparently conflicting methods advocated by Hart and Sacks in The Legal Process. See Aleinikoff, supra note 77,
at 36-37. Because Hart and Sacks considered law a dynamic process, Aleinikoff concludes that
their legal process model encourages the interpreting court to adhere to currently accepted
statutory construction. Id. Aleinikoff supports his conclusion with examples of Hart and Sacks's
tenets emphasizing dynamic interpretation and not the enacting legislature's intent. Id. at 36
n.78, 37 n.79.
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ing legislature to determine statutory purpose would ignore societal
dependence on the stability of the civil rights precedent.9 A court
recognizing Aleinikoffs revised reading of the legal process modelg
would consider the role of the particular precedent in the existing
legal system and define statutory purpose according to prior interpretations, thereby protecting societal dependence on the civil rights precedent.
Because of its focus on statutory purpose, the legal process model
leaves another question unanswered. How would a court following the
legal process model deal with a dormant precedent, the statutory
interpretation of which conflicts with contemporary social expectations? 1 ° Imagine a dated precedent narrowly interpreting a civil rights
statute. Since the time of the precedential decision, society increasingly
has recognized the need for racial equality. Additionally, imagine that
no court has recognized the statute as the basis of a claim or defense
for several years. Should a contemporary defendant be allowed to rely
on the dated precedential interpretation on the grounds that it coincides with statutory purpose?
Under Aleinikoffs revised reading of the legal process model, the
court could re-interpret statutory purpose in the context of the current
legal system and society.1°1 To further society's heightened awareness
of civil rights, the court necessarily would ignore the enacting legislature and the statutory purpose inferred by the prior court. The court
would also have to defy stare decisis'° and define "statutory purpose"
broadly enough to encompass "social purpose." Only a court bold
enough to follow these steps could reach a socially acceptable result.

98. See generally Patterson, 108 S. Ct. at 1423 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (To reconsider
Runyon's expansion of civil rights under § 1981 'Is to replace a sense of guaranteed right with
the uneasiness of unsecured privilege.").
99. See supra text accompanying notes 92-95.
100. Aleinikoff poses a related hypothetical. See Aleinikoff, supra note 77, at 36. He asks
the reader to consider an adjudicator interpreting an older statute. Id. 'The requirement that
judges fit the statute into the legal system as a whole will necessarily mean that statement of
the older statute's purpose will be influenced by events occurring after the enactment." Id.
Stare decisis will influence the interpreting court because it "may be an important part of the
current legal system, and earlier precedents may still reflect or be the basis for current substantive values." Id.
101. See supra text accompanying notes 92-95.
102. Aleinikoff points out that civil rights groups have relied on stare decisis in arguing
that Runyon's interpretation of § 1981 should stand. See Aleinikoff, supra note 77, at 51.
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The Nautical Model

The nautical analysis is a version of the legal process purposive
analysis that focuses on current social expectations. 1' 3 The nautical
model posits that the legislature "charts the initial course" of legislation, but the courts set the "current course." According to Aleinikoff,
Hart and Sacks's legal process model is "archeological" because it
uncovers the meaning of the enacting legislature to determine statu1 In striking contrast to "archeological"''0 models of
tory purpose."4
statutory interpretation, the "nautical"'' 6 model eliminates the original
intent inquiry and focuses on present social norms. The nautical model
premises that the deciding court should interpret the statute in question as though it had been enacted by the current legislature.' °7 The
court must then determine the legislature's objective and the meaning
a contemporary reader would glean from the statute. 0 8 In answering
these questions, the court must determine whether the statute fits
into the current legislative scheme' 9 and whether the interpretation
coincides with present common law and constitutional norms. 110

103. See supra text accompanying notes 84-91.
104. Aleinikoff, supra note 77, at 24.
105. "Archeological" statutory interpretation considers 'the meaning of a statute ...
set
in stone on the date of its enactment, and... the interpreter's task to uncover and reconstruct
that original meaning." Id. at 21.
106. Aleinikoff utilizes the nautical metaphor to describe his theory of statutory interpretation as an ongoing process or voyage. See id. The nautical model holds that the legislature, as
shipbuilder, "charts [the] initial course" of legislation, but the courts, as navigators, set "the
current course" of legislation. See id. In an effort to adhere to principles of stare decisis, Justice
Stevens employed a nautical focus in his Runyon concurrence. Runyon, 427 U.S. at 189-92
(Stevens, J., concurring); see also Aleinikoff, supra note 77, at 20-21 (asserting that Justice
Stevens's Runyon concurrence suggested the archeological and nautical approaches to statutory
interpretation). Likewise, Justice Stevens's Patterson dissent emphasized not the correctness
of the Runyon Court's statutory interpretation, but the contemporary social climate regarding
antidiscrimination. Patterson, 108 S. Ct. at 1422-23 (Stevens, J., dissenting). In fact, Justice
Stevens declared in Runyon his belief that the Jones Court's interpretation of § 1982 was
erroneous. Runyon, 427 U.S. at 190 (Stevens, J., concurring); see also Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer
Co., 392 U.S. 409, 437 (1968) (holding that § 1982 prohibited public and private acts of racial
discrimination in renting or selling real property).
107. Aleinikoff, supra note 77, at 49.
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Id. Although in this discussion Aleinikoff omits the question of whether the interpretation coincides with present social norms, the preliminary questions that a court must ask
when following the nautical approach are based on current social norms. See supra text accompanying note 108.
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These steps suggest that the nautical model could result in statutory interpretation defying both the intent of the enacting legislature
and the principles of stare decisis.', Yet the nautical model purports
to recognize the importance of stability and reliance, the values protected by stare decisis.1 1 Courts using the nautical model would consider society's perception of and reliance on prior interpretations. Stare
decisis values would thereby protect precedent consistent with current
social expectations and contributing to the coherence of the current
legal system.113
Stare decisis notwithstanding, Aleinikoff uses the nautical model
4
to analyze Patterson as though Runyon had never been decided.11
The plain language of section 1981 fails to show whether the statute
covers private discrimination. However, contemporary social mores
indicate that a recently enacted civil rights law would combat private
acts of discrimination that significantly contribute to unequal opportunity. Thus, nautical analysis determines that section 1981 prohibits
private discrimination.
Because Aleinikoff limits his inquiry to initial statutory interpretation, the nautical model stops short of analyzing the role that stare
decisis and reliance should play in the "whether to overrule" equation.116 In the Patterson context, stare decisis and reliance enhance
6
the already-strong nautical argument in support of affirming Runyon
and protecting society's perception of the Court's commitment to racial
equality. But in a situation in which a prior court narrowly construed
a civil rights statute, a court following the nautical model would face
a serious dilemma: choosing between the contemporary social value
of racial equality and the opposing contemporary social value of free7
dom of association backed by social reliance and stare decisis.1

111.

Aleinikoff, supra note 77, at 51. See generally id. at 47-50 (discussing the enacting

legislature's intent and subsequent judicial interpretation pointing to the exclusion of homosexual
aliens under the Immigration and Nationality Act, then analyzing the statute nautically.)
112. See id. at 52.
113. See id. at 52-53.
114. See id. at 63-66. However, stare decisis factors into the "whether to overrule" equation.
The impact of the nautical model on the equation is discussed infra in text accompanying notes
115-19.
115. See Aleinikoff, supra note 77, at 61. Nor does the nautical approach contemplate the

role of legislative inaction in this equation. See id. A recommended approach for factoring
legislative inaction into the equation in a civil rights context appears suprain text accompanying

notes 45-60.
116.
117.

See Aleinikoff, supra note 77, at 66.
Aleinikoff recognizes the problem of competing social values. See id. at 61. He argues

that in the employment context presented by Patterson, antidiscrimination trumps arguments
based on freedom of association. See id.
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Although society's desire for antidiscrimination weighs heavily in
the Pattersonemployment context, 118 it does not clearly outweigh freedom of association in other contexts. Should a court consider the
reliance of persons who chose to operate private schools because the
judiciary interpreted statutes not to reach acts of private discrimination? Should these owners be forced to choose between desegregating
and going out of business if a later court looks to present social expectations and reverses precedent? Should a racist's reliance on the stability of precedent factor into the "whether to overrule" equation?
Because of these questions, a court following the nautical model
would have to decide whether the moral quality of the reliance on
statutory based precedent matters. In fact, to accept Aleinikoffs premise that the law must reflect contemporary society's expectations is
to demand that courts consider the moral quality of reliance on precedent. The nautical model is therefore indefinite as to the role that
social reliance and stare decisis should play in the "whether to overrule" equation." 9
IV. THE SUPREME COURT'S ANALYSIS OF
CIVIL RIGHTS STATUTES: INTERPRETATION AND OVERRULING
Recent Supreme Court opinions also reflect uncertainty regarding
the roles of social reliance, stare decisis, and other factors in the
"whether to overrule" equation. When deciding the fate of statutory
based civil rights precedent, the Court inconsistently focuses on legislative inaction, original intent, social reliance, and stare decisis. Some
Justices disagree as to when social reliance should enter the "whether
to overrule" equation. This disagreement stems from the Court's focus
on original intent in the context of initial statutory interpretation.
A.

The Original Intent Inquiry

Recent decisions involving initial statutory interpretation illustrate
the Court's view that the enacting legislature, not contemporary social
expectations, dictates the meaning of a civil rights statute. In each
of two companion cases, Shaare Tefila Congregation v. Cobbl2° and
Saint Francis College v. Al-Khazraji,1' the Court reached a socially
acceptable result but limited its rationale to the original intent in-

118. See id.
119. See supra note 114 and accompanying text.
120. 107 S. Ct. 2019 (1987).
121. 107 S. Ct. 2022 (1987).
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qury.12 Used consistently, the Court's rationale would jeopardize the
civil rights of minorities in contemporary society.
The unanimous Shaare Tefila Court held that section 1982 protects
Jews from private acts of discrimination.m Although Jews are not
considered a separate race in today's society, they were the "kind of
group" that Congress intended to protect when it enacted the Civil
Rights Act of 1866, the source of section 1982. 2The Court emphasized
that its interpretation of section 1982 did not depend on whether Jews
are today considered a distinct race.1 Rather, the relevant inquiry
was whether the enacting Congress considered Jews a distinct race.126
The Al-Khazraji Court unanimously read section 1981 as prohibiting private acts of discrimination against Arabs.m The Court defined
"race" by examining nineteenth-century dictionaries and encyclopedias.2 Reading the legislative history in light of these sources,
the Court determined that when Congress enacted the Voting Rights
Act of 1870, one source of section 1981, it intended to protect Arabs
from intentional private discrimination.'2
Because the results in both cases protected the civil rights of
minorities, the Court's rationale tends to be ignored. In both cases,
however, the Court narrowly defined statutory purpose and failed to
consider present social expectations. The Court defined statutory purpose to encompass discrimination against "races" as defined when Congress enacted the statutes in the nineteenth century. 13 Although the
Court did not define statutory purpose so narrowly as to include only
discrimination aimed at those races mentioned in legislative history, 131
it limited itself to determining only the enacting Congress's intent.

122.

See Shaare Tefila, 107 S. Ct. at 2021-22; Al-Khazraji, 107 S. Ct. at 2026-28.

123. Shaare Tefila, 107 S. Ct. at 2022.
124.

Id. at 2021. According to Jones, § 1982 sprang from the Civil Rights Act of 1866.

Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 437 (1968); see also supra note 18 (discussing the
Jones rationale).
125. Shaare Tefila, 107 S. Ct. at 2022.

126. Id.
127. Al-Khazraji, 107 S. Ct. at 2028. Both Shaare Tefila and Al-Khazraji illustrate the
Court's pre-Patterson acceptance of the Jones and Runyon decisions holding that §§ 1981 and
1982 reach acts of private discrimination. See also supra notes 3-6 & 18 and accompanying
text (discussing the Jones and Runyon rationales).
128.
129.
130.
131.

AI-Khazraji, 107 S. Ct. at 2027-28.
Id.
Shaare Tefila, 107 S. Ct. at 2021-22; Al-Khazraji, 107 S. Ct. at 2026-27.
Al-Khazraji, 107 S. Ct. at 2028.
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Accordingly, the Court pointedly refused to consider society's expectations regarding racial equality.132
In light of the Court's refusal to consider social expectations, what
decision would the Court have reached had Congress intended to protect only those groups that had to date experienced racial discrimination? Would the Court have refused to extend statutory protection to
a group only now, but not then considered a separate race? The Court's
narrow view of statutory purpose indicates that it would have refused
to extend the protection. Had the Court defined statutory purpose
more broadly, Shaare Tefila and Al-Khazraji would have been
stronger statements of the Court's commitment to racial equality. The
Court also missed an opportunity to delineate what social criteria, if
any, are relevant to interpreting civil rights statutes. Instead, Shaare
Tefila and Al-Khazraji illustrate the Court's willingness to interpret
statutes according to the enacting legislature's intent.
B.

Overruling Statutory Based Civil Rights Precedent

Similarly, the Court has recently focused on the enacting legislature's intent when deciding whether to overrule statutory based civil
rights precedent. In these situations, social criteria take on added
importance. Yet, in ordering re-argument as to the scope of section
1981, the Patterson majority refused to consider societal dependence
on Runyon's interpretation of section 1981.13 Likewise, in Monell v.
Department of Social Services,13 the only civil rights overruling cited
by the Pattersonmajority, the Court restricted itself to the original
intent inquiry. The Court determined the enacting legislature's purpose 15 and dissected statutory language.136 The Monell Court determined that municipalities are "persons" liable for damages under section 1983.137 Further, the Court examined legislative history and determined that in Monroe v. Pape3 it had misinterpreted legislative de-

132. See Shaare Tefila, 107 S. Ct. at 2022. Justice White's opinion emphasized that the
issue before the Court was "not whether Jews are considered to be a separate race by today's
standards, but whether, at the time § 1982 was adopted, Jews constituted a group of people
that Congress intended to protect." Id.
133. Patterson, 108 S.Ct. at 1421.
134. 436 U.S. 658 (1978).
135. Id. at 685, 700-01.
136. Id. at 664-90.
137. Id. at 700-01. The Monell Court specified that a municipality may be held liable under
§ 1983 when official municipal policy instigates a constitutional tort. Id. at 690. Municipalities
are not liable under respondeatsuperiorunless the employee causing the injury acted pursuant
to official municipal policy. Id. at 691-94.
138. 365 U.S. 167 (1961).
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bate and erroneously granted municipalities immunity from section
1983 suits.139 Most importantly, Monell and Pattersonreveal that when
the Court looks beyond original intent, its rationale in decisions
whether to overrule is inconsistent.
Juxtaposing Monell and Pattersonillustrates that the Court selects
criteria randomly when determining whether to overrule statutory
based civil rights precedent. The Court's random reasoning suggests
a number of permutations:
1. The Court may consider social reliance on precedent when
doing so provides reason to uphold a decision that increased civil

rights. 140
2. The Court may ignore social reliance that is morally repugnant
to predominating social expectations.'14
3. The Court may factor only economic reliance into the "whether
to overrule" equation.142
143
4. The Court may consider legislative inaction in the equation,

or it may qualify the type of inaction that implies tacit acceptance of
judicial statutory interpretation.T
5. The Court may invoke the doctrine of stare decisis,145 or it
may ignore it in the name of "accurate" statutory interpretation. 4 r,
Two sources of disagreement within the Monell and Patterson
decisions illustrate the lack of a settled test for deciding whether to

139. Monell, 436 U.S. at 664-90.
140. The Patterson dissents advocated this approach. See Patterson, 108 S. Ct. at 1421-22
(Blackmun, J., dissenting); id. at 1422-23 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
141. The Monell majority took this approach. See Monell, 436 U.S. at 699-700.
142. The Monel majority advocated this approach by quoting with approval Justice
Frankfurter's idea that social reliance on precedent occurs only in areas of commercial law. See
id. (citing Monroe, 365 U.S. at 221-22 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting in part)). However, Justice
Rehnquist, dissenting in Monell, also supported the idea of considering society's economic reliance
on precedent. See id. at 717 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). The fact that Justice Rehnquist found
that municipalities had economically relied on Monroe, and the majority found no such reliance,
illustrates that the Court randomly selects criteria for overruling statutory based civil rights
precedent.
143. The Patterson dissents and the Monell dissent considered legislative inaction. See
Patterson, 108 S. Ct. at 1421-22 (Blackmun, J., dissenting); id. at 1422-23 (Stevens, J., dissenting); Monell, 436 U.S. at 714, 718-19 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
144. The Monell majority did so. See Monell, 436 U.S. at 695-99.
145. The Pattersondissents and the Monell dissent considered stare decisis. See Patterson,
108 S. Ct. at 1421-22 (Blackmun, J., dissenting); id. at 1422-23 (Stevens, J., dissenting); Monell,
436 U.S. at 714-15 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
146. The Monell majority honored correct statutory interpretation above stare decisis. See
Monell, 436 U.S. at 683-91. The Patterson majority and the Monell dissent would be willing
to do so. See Patterson,108 S. Ct. at 1421; Monell, 436 U.S. at 719 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
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overrule statutory based civil rights precedent. First, the majority
opinions of both Courts clashed with the respective minority opinions
as to whether legislative inaction constituted tacit acceptance ofjudicial
statutory interpretation. Ordering re-argument, the Pattersonmajority ignored the dissenters' assertion that Congress had acquiesced in
the Runyon Court's interpretation of section 1981.147 Likewise, the
Monell majority found no legislative approval of Monroe even though
Congress left intact Monroe's interpretation of section 1983 and the
Court's three re-affirmations of Monroe.14
Like the Pattersonmajority, the Monell majority delineated the
type of legislative inaction that it would consider in the "'Whether to
overrule" equation. The Monell majority stated that Congress showed
"no hostility" to post-Monroe section 1983 suits that defied Monroe
and named municipalities as defendants. 149 The Monell majority
reasoned that Congress therefore had refused to approve Monroe's
statutory interpretation. 150 The Monell dissent, on the other hand,
reasoned that Monroe's reading of section 1983 had received legislative
approval through congressional silence and three judicial affirmations.' 5' Particularly because the law regarding municipal immunity
affects a large segment of society, Congress would have acted if it
disagreed with Monroe.'52 Hence, the Monell dissent found that postMonroe legislative inaction reflected Congress's approval of Monroe,
but the Monell majority found no legislative approval of Monroe.
The Monell and Patterson Courts also disagreed as to the importance of social reliance. The Pattersonmajority stated that the Court
would defy neutral principles of adjudication if it recognized that Runyon advanced civil rights,0 while the dissents addressed social reliance
"built upon" Runyon.'T Thus, the Patterson dissenters, but not the
majority, would be willing to consider social reliance on precedent
that increased civil rights of minorities.

147.
148.
149.
150.
151.

Patterson,108 S. Ct. at 1422 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
See Monell, 436 U.S. at 695-700.
See id. at 696.
See id.
See id. at 714-15 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).

152. Id. at 719 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). 'This is not some esoteric branch of the law in
which congressional silence might reasonably be equated with congressional indifference." Id.;
see also Farber, supra note 11, at 14-15. Farber discusses the Pattersonmajority's and dissents'

contrasting views on the meaning of principled adjudication. Id.
153.

See Patterson, 108 S. Ct. at 1421.

154. Id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
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Like the PattersonCourt, the Monell majority and dissenting opinions conflicted as to the importance of social reliance in the "whether
to overrule" equation. The Monroe Court granted municipalities immunity under section 1983; it did not increase the civil rights of
minorities.c5 Thus, the Monell majority refused to consider whether
municipalities relied on Monroe's reading of section 1983, and insisted
that because Monroe denied minorities their constitutional rights,
municipalities had no right to rely on it. 156In so reasoning, the Monell
majority ignored social reliance that was morally repugnant to the
predominating social desire for antidiscrimination. The Monell dissent,
on the other hand, would have considered whether municipalities had
relied on Monroe's reading of section 1983 and would have ignored
the morally repugnant nature of municipal reliance. 157
In addition to the moral nature of social reliance, the Monell majority implied that it would consider social reliance on statutory based
precedent only in commercial law.'5 The Court thereby reasoned that
only economic reliance counts in the decision whether to overrule and
that members of society do not rely on civil rights precedent. At the
same time, the Monell majority refused to consider whether
municipalities had relied economically on Monroe's reading of section
1983. Writing for the Monell dissent, then-Justice Rehnquist extolled
the virtues of stare decisis while sympathizing with municipalities that
relied on Monroe's interpretation of section 1983.1r 9 Municipalities,
with their 'imited treasuries,"1 based their insurance coverage and
indemnity ordinances on Monroe's reading municipal immunity into
section 1983.161 Justice Rehnquist's Monell dissent would allow
only compelling circumstances to justify the Court's abandoning a statutory based precedent. 162 Indeed, the dissent maintained that because
stare decisis values are so important, compelling circumstances exist
only if irrefutable evidence proves that the prior decision misinter-

155. Rather, Monroe granted municipalities immunity from § 1983 suits. Monroe, 365 U.S.
at 187.
156. See Monell, 436 U.S. at 699-700.
157. See id. at 717 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
158. See id. at 700. The Court quoted with approval Justice Frankfurter's statement in
Monroe that § 1983 "is not an area of commercial law in which . . . individuals may have
arranged their affairs in reliance on the expected stability of decision."' Id. (quoting Monroe,
365 U.S. at 221-22 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting in part)).
159. See id. at 717-18, 724 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
160. Id. at 724 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
161. Id. at 717 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
162. See id. at 715 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1989

27

Florida Law Review, Vol. 41, Iss. 2 [1989], Art. 5
396

FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 41

preted the statute. 10 Thus, Justice Rehnquist's Monell dissent
emphasizes the importance of upholding precedent to protect the interests of those who have relied on it. Ironically, Justice Rehnquist
voted with the Patterson majority that presumed the presence of
"compelling circumstances" and abandoned stare decisis in favor of
"accurate" statutory interpretation.164
Monell and Patterson evidence that in the statutory based civil
rights context, the Court selects criteria randomly when deciding
whether to overrule precedent. As a result, the relative weights of
legislative inaction, social value, and stare decisis remain unclear.
Courts can use these criteria to form a consistent approach for deciding
whether to overrule statutory based civil rights precedent.
V.

RECOMMENDATION

The sociological natural law, revised legal process, and nautical
models illustrate that courts can interpret according to present social
expectations without rewriting statutes and usurping legislative authority. By considering legislative inaction, elements of these models
of interpretation, and social value in deciding whether to overrule
statutory based civil rights precedent, courts can effect decisions that
respect both legislative authority and contemporary society's expectations.
Courts deciding whether to overrule statutory based civil rights
decisions should follow a consistent test that respects both legislative
authority and the social value of precedent. The test proposed by this
note first balances legislative inaction and the social value of precedent.
To ensure respect for legislative authority, courts already consider
legislative inaction when deciding whether to overrule precedent.'r
By determining the social value of the judicial statutory interpretation
followed by legislative inaction, courts can ensure decisions honoring
contemporary social expectations. Considering social value along with
legislative inaction would guarantee that contemporary social expectations do not give way to original legislative intent that no longer
reflects society's expectations regarding civil rights. On the other
hand, legislative inaction would control when inaction follows a precedent that reflects contemporary society's expectations.
After considering legislative inaction, the test proposed by th,.
note employs elements from the sociological natural law, revised legal
process, and nautical models. The sociological natural law element
163. Id. at 719 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
164. See Patterson, 108 S. Ct. at 1419-21; Monell, 436 U.S. at 714-24 (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting).
165. See supra text accompanying note 15.
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directs courts to consider how overruling will affect society's view of
the judiciary's commitment to civil rights.'r By directing courts to
articulate the social reasons for deciding whether to overrule precedent, 167 the sociological natural law element fosters respect for the
legal system.' s The test's second element, borrowed from revised legal
process analysis, directs courts to look at the purpose of the individual
statute and the goals of the current legal system.16 9 In following the
revised legal process model, courts would overrule precedent based
on statutory purpose that no longer reflects society's expectations
regarding civil rights. Third, the nautical element of the test directs
courts to read the statute as would a member of contemporary society.1 70 If the precedential interpretation coincides with the contemporary reading, it should survive. If the precedential interpretation offends the contemporary reading, it should fall. By invoking this proposed test, courts could decide whether to overrule statutory based
civil rights precedent by focusing on the needs and goals of contemporary society.
VI.

CONCLUSION

Although the PattersonCourt probably will not overrule Runyon's
interpretation of section 1981, the fate of future statutory based civil
rights precedent will remain uncertain unless the Court articulates a
test for deciding whether to overrule. Minorities, especially civil rights
litigants, will have won a hollow victory if the PattersonCourt affirms
Runyon but fails to set forth criteria for future application. In order
to protect social expectations regarding civil rights, the stability of
precedent must depend on consistent criteria. The Pattersondissents
and theories of statutory interpretation insist that social value is legally
relevant in the decision whether to overrule. Although the enacting
legislature's view of what constitutes civil rights is important to the
decision whether to overrule, that view may be dated and therefore
may fail to protect contemporary social expectations. Racial equality
is a constant, fundamental American value, but its definition changes
over time. By considering social value in the "whether to overrule"
equation, along with legislative inaction and stare decisis, courts can
use the enacting legislature's intent to protect contemporary society's
expectations of racial equality.

166.
167.
168.
169.
170.

See
See
See
See
See

supra text
supra text
supra text
supra text
supra text

accompanying
accompanying
accompanying
accompanying
accompanying

notes 77-79.
note 79.
notes 56-58.
notes 92-95.
notes 106-10.
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Author's note:
On June 15, 1989, the United States Supreme Court handed down its decision in Patterson
v. McLean Credit Union. Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 57 U.S.L.W. 4705 (June 15, 1989).
As this note anticipated, Patterson was an "easy case"; the Court, through Justice Kennedy,
unanimously voted to affirm Runyon's holding that § 1981 prohibits racial discrimination in the
making and enforcement of private contracts. See supra text accompanying notes 5-6. The Court
predictably relied on the doctrine of stare decisis and reasoned that absent "special justification"
it would not overrule precedent, particularly precedent involving statutory interpretation. Patterson, 57 U.S.L.W. at 4707. Although it affirmed Runyon, the Court articulated no test for
determining whether to overrule statutory based civil rights precedent and strictly limited the
situations in which plaintiffs may state a cause of action under § 1981. Id. at 4706-09. Reading
statutory language literally, thus adhering to the enacting legislature's intent, five Justices
found that § 1981 does not prohibit racially based postemployment harassment or firings because
these situations do not fit squarely under the "making" or "enforcement of" contracts. Id. at
4708-09. The Court held further that § 1981 prohibits racially based refusals to promote only
when the promotion would involve entering into a new contract. Id. at 4710. Taking a more
purposeful view of statutory language, Justice Stevens argued that "a contract [is] evidence of
a[n]... ongoing relationship between human beings." Id. at 4720 (Stevens, J., concurring in
the judgment in part and dissenting in part). Accordingly, the dissenters argued that § 1981
does prohibit racially based postemployment harassment. Id. at 4716, 4719 (Brennan, Blackmun,
Marshall, and Stevens, JJ., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part).
The opinions also reflect the Court's ongoing internal disagreement as to the weight of
legislative inaction. See supra text accompanying notes 17-21. Justice Kennedy asserted the
"'impossibil[ity of asserting] with any degree of assurance that congressional failure to act
represents' affirmative congressional approval of the Court's statutory interpretation." Id. at
4707-08 n.1 (citing Johnson v. Transportation Agency, 480 U.S. 616, 671-72 (1987) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting)). Justice Brennan, on the other hand, argued that post-Runyon congressional silence
translated into Congress's ratifying the Runyon Court's interpretation of § 1981. Id. at 4714
(Brennan, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part).
Besides treading the traditional grounds of stare decisis and legislative inaction, the Court
discussed the social value of the Runyon precedent. See id. at 4707, 4711. Breaking from its
usual concentration on the enacting legislature's intent, the Court stated that the Runyon
Court's interpretation of § 1981, right or wrong, "is entirely consistent with our society's deep
commitment to the eradication of discrimination based on a person's race ... ." Id. at 4707.
The Court invoked "society's consensus that [racial] discrimination ... is a profound wrong of
tragic dimension" to buttress its decision to affirm Runyon. Id. at 4711. But in limiting the
scope of § 1981 to cover only pre-employment discrimination, the Court contradicted its emerging
commitment to social value. Five Justices remained unwilling to read § 1981 broadly enough to
encompass racially discriminatory acts that hinder an ongoing contractual relationship. But Justice Brennan promoted a broad reading. For him, the determinative issue in § 1981 actions
should be "whether the acts constituting harassment were sufficiently severe or pervasive as
effectively to belie any claim that the contract was entered into in a racially neutral manner."
Id. at 4716 (Brennan, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part).
The Court's affirmation of Runyon is a hollow victory for civil rights plaintiffs. See supra
part VI. By limiting § 1981's scope to cover only pre-employment discrimination and refusals
to promote to a position that would entail entering a new contract, the Court rejected purposive
statutory interpretation. Thus, only a narrow class of civil rights plaintiffs can seek relief under
§ 1981, which, unlike Title VII, covers discrimination by employers of less than fifteen persons,
awards backpay beyond a two-year limit, and awards damages, including punitive damages, in
addition to backpay. Id. at 4717 (Brennan, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting
in part).
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